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Onward – Jim
01 October 2009
Please find below a copy of the Statement of Claim to be filed in the High Court of New Zealand, Palmerston North registry tomorrow, the 2nd October 2009.
The document will filed after a protest is run outside the Court titled “Paint the Complaint. The protest will run from 12 – 2pm.
It should be advised that the behaviour of the applicant Easton is becoming more extreme as injustice is frequent and allegations of impropriety are not being met by the proper authorities and Ministries. For example:
This application has been turned away by the High Court Registrar on an earlier occasion stating the applicant Easton does not have the standing to bring the complaint.
That decision belongs to a judge and not to the Registrar, where the decision by the LCRO is the first decision it has made and the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 makes a provision for the applicant to have been party in advocacy to the proceedings.
Complaints about this decision by the Registrar have not received any reply from the Ministry of Justice or from the Minister for the Courts.
Copies of this document are necessarily distributed relative to the New Zealand Courts and their capacity to protect injustices and corruption as they are prevalent and in operation, as unchecked within the walls of the New Zealand Courts.
CA793/2008 Easton v Broadcasting Commission and ors
SC 55/2009 – Benjamin Morland EASTON v Broadcasting Commission and Anor (Leave Judgment)
The Political Busker
(of a) father’s coalition.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
PALMERSTON NORTH REGISTRY
UNDER: Judicature Amendment Act 1972
IN THE MATTER: A judicial review of LCRO/01 decision.
BETWEEN BENJAMIN MORLAND EASTON
AND THE FAMILY COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
First Respondent (Palmerston North)
AND LEGAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW OFFICE (CROWN)
Second Respondent (Auckland)
STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Dated: 2 October 2009
Next proceeding: Unknown
Benjamin Morland Easton
(of a) father’s coalition. PO Box 24415 Manners St Wellington
Ph: 0273902169 firstname.lastname@example.org
TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT
I, Benjamin Morland Easton, applicant for the above proceeding seek a judicial review of the Legal Complaints Review Office LCRO 01 / 08 12 March 2008.
I do so on the standing that:
· I have compiled, filed and made submissions on and to all documents.
· I have made these submissions because L does not have the skill or the experience to bring this challenge before the Court.
· I do so directly relative to challenge the ‘environment’ of gender discrimination within the Family Court, where the only jurisdiction open to challenging that discrimination is through judicial review and I am the most able individual relative to this case to bring such proceedings.
Quarantine Waste (NZ) Ltd v Waste Resources Ltd  NZRMA 529
· I have a protection order against me protecting me from my son and daughter where I am a trained early childhood educator of supervisory level and it is accepted I have never been violent, physically, sexually or emotionally to either my son or daughter or my ex-wife.
o That my former wife has openly perjured herself in court on two occasions but remains protected for those actions of misleading court.
o Those proceedings are identical in nature, where while the Family Court is invulnerable from allegations against its discrimination gross injustice can and has been supervised and maintained.
· To excuse these proceedings on the grounds of standing would breach natural justice and be an unfair extension of the inherent practice.
· That the only other institution capable of bringing these proceedings to the attention of the Court is the Human Rights Commission and the commission is under judicial review for its protection of gender discrimination failing to use its jurisdiction and powers of general inquiry under the Human Rights Act 1993 s5 (2) (h).
CIV 2009 485-726 Easton v Human Rights Commission and ors,
· That any lawyer taking the case would have a natural conflict of interest as the substantive proceedings are relative to a faulted application of the Law Society and the Ministry of Justice in self regulatory roles.
· That in all matters under the Care of Children 2004, s4, the welfare and best interests of the child are the first and paramount consideration overriding the power of the Court and the society of law to protect itself from fact based criticism in respect of how family law processes are applied.
Peter Joseph Burns v Department of Child, Youth and Family Services & ors  NZHRRT 7 (4 April 2005)
Review on the grounds:
· The decision is made from errors of fact; and
· The decision is not fair and is biased; an
· The decision is ultra vires
Relative to the First Respondent
1. 1 October 2007, a lawyer from Winter Woods Lawyers (WW) of Palmerston North applied on behalf of D, to the First Respondent, Palmerston North Family Court (the Court), under s7 and s13 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (the DVA), and under section 47, 48 and 49 of the Care of Children Act 2004, (the COCA) for a Without Notice protection order and a parenting order. The application was made against L. The application carried a signed application by D, on behalf of C, being the natural biological and infant son and only child of L and D. The application for a without notice parenting order stated that there were s60 DVA concerns. S60 deals with without notice applications relative to and limited by physical or sexual violence.
1.1 Under s16 of the DVA, Protection of persons other than applicant, if granted, C would be protected from L by any protection order
1.2 The Court dealt with the matters on paper and satisfied with the jurisdictional matters in respect of domestic violence, being that there was a domestic relationship and the need for protection (ss3, 14 respectively – DVA) and in respect of delay that would or might entail a risk of harm or undue hardship if proceeding on notice (s13 (1) DVA), made a temporary protection order on the without notice basis.
1.2.1 An interim parenting order pursuant to s48 (1) 54(1) of the COCA was made granting the day to day care of C to D. As a specific application had not been filed by WW an application under 48 (1) was directed to be filed.
1.3 Leave was reserved for L to apply for supervised contact on 48 hours notice.
1.4 The jurisdiction provided was s27 DVA and/or s48 (1) of the COCA.
1.5 No application specific application under 48 (1) was filed.
Other relevant information
2. On the 3 October 2007 a lawyer from Fitzherbert Rowe (FR) was appointed for C.
2.1 On 23 October a report by FR was filed. The content of the report advised that D now said there were no physical violence allegations against L. FR dismissed the need of s60 DVA concerns. The report also recognised that D was agreeable to unsupervised access. It noted that L wanted ‘shared care’ and had undergone counselling claiming further ‘specialist counselling’ was in consideration. It observed that L accepted that he was at times suicidal. The summary stated that while D had no concerns about supervision FR had those concerns relative to mental health and such wellbeing.
2.2 L would contest the accuracy of the FR report.
2.3 No further Court proceedings had been filed for by either L or D.
2.4 Mark Dobson Lawyers, (MD) first met with L on 31 January 2008. L terminated MD’s legal services on 30 June 2008.
Relative to the applicant
3. On 6 June, L corresponded with the Applicant, Benjamin Easton (BE). On 29 June L met BE. BE then wrote to WW and on that day. (For the purpose of clarity of this document BE is assigned to all actions or signatures in L’s name).
Relative to the original complaint
4. On 9 September BE wrote to the Manawatu Standards Committee, (MSC) complaining about WW.
4.1 On 16 September MSC dismissed the complaint.
Relative to the Second Respondent
5. On 18 October BE wrote to the Second Respondent the Legal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO).
5.1 On 28 October LCRO replied to BE. Thereafter there was considerable correspondence.
5.2 On Wednesday 17 December a teleconference was convened. In the conference BE raised concern that D and C may no longer be residing in Palmerton North and instead may be living in Christchurch.
5.3 L was advised by WW, soon after the conference with confirmation.
5.4 A hearing was then convened on 17 February 2009.
5.5 A decision was given 12 March dismissing BE’s complaint.
6. 2 October 2009, BE files for judicial review.
Statement of Claim against First Respondent
· Unfair decision and inconsistent with natural justice
· Biased decision against men and fathers
· Decision made on errors of fact
7. The decision of the Court on 1 October 2007 to grant the application of a temporary protection order and an interim parenting order against L was inconsistent with natural justice, it was unfair and biased against men and fathers; made from obvious errors of fact.
7.1 The very nature of without notice orders, impede fundamental rights enshrined to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990: for example: s9 right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment; and s14 freedom of expression; and s17 freedom of association; and s18 freedom of movement; and s24 rights of person charged / to be informed promptly of charge / to consult a lawyer / to have time and facilities to prepare a defence; and s25 to be presumed innocent until proved guilty / to be present and present a defence / to examine evidence and question witnesses under the same conditions as the prosecution; and s27 to a fair trial and right to natural justice.
7.2 Under this one sided jurisdiction the party subjected to the without notice application is already at a heavy disadvantage. In the case of L, as the events unfolded, compared against the behaviour of D, in fact removing C from Palmerston North to Christchurch, he, (along with infant C) is already a committed victim of unfairness, prior to any subsequent facilities of access to justice.
7.3 Under r3 of the Family Court Rules 2002 the purpose of the Court is to act fairly:
Purpose of these rules
(1) The purpose of these rules is to make it possible for proceedings in Family Courts to be dealt with—
(a) as fairly, inexpensively, simply, and speedily as is consistent with justice; and
7.4 Under r13 any practice that is not consistent with the rules must not be followed.
13 Practices must be consistent
(1) A practice that is not consistent with these rules or a family law Act must not be followed in any Court.
7.5 Under r 17 (1) (a) any failure by WW beginning proceedings for without notice orders must be treated as an irregularity. The Court recognised a specific application had not been made under s48 (1) of the COCA. The direction by the Court requiring WW to make this application can and should only be interpreted under the jurisdiction of r17 (2) (b).
17 Failure to comply with rules
(1) If these rules have not been complied with in beginning or purporting to begin any proceedings, or at any stage in the course of or in connection with any proceedings, that failure to comply—
a) must be treated as an irregularity; and
2) If these rules have not been fully complied with at some stage of any proceedings,—
(b) whether or not he or she acts under paragraph (a), the Judge may make any other order (for example, as to costs, or adjourning the proceedings) he or she thinks appropriate.
7.6 Given WW’s failure, then inconsistent with the practice and purpose (fairness and consistent with justice) of the Rules; and given that s60 concerns were raised, alone, in the signed application by D, in relation to physical and sexual violence by L against C; and no such claims or evidence presented exists; and s60 concerns were later dismissed as unwarrantable by the lawyer for C; and given that the Court did not of its own consideration draw reference to the s60 allegation: strong indicators existed for the Court that r17 (2) (a) (ii) could and should prevail over (b) and the without notice part of the application should be set aside.
a) the Judge may set the proceedings aside entirely or take any or all of the following steps:
(ii) set aside, wholly or in part, any step in them:
KLB v DT (Unreported) FAM 2008 000002 &58
7.7 Furthermore, on reasonable study of the affidavit the Court could determine that paragraph 41 (c) was a sub paragraph that had been compiled from different parts of the affidavit and the meaning of “if he had a gun he would use it’ was directly scaremongering and placed out of context with the surrounding text.
7.8 Additionally, the Court has overstated s13 of the DVA where the concept of s13 ss1 (b) “”undue hardship” is independent and discretionary. S13 ss1 (a) “risk of harm” is the weighted or plausible cause for action. S13 ss1 (b) cannot be sustained on the evidence for its lack of presentation.
13 Application without notice for protection order
(1) A protection order may be made on an application without notice if the Court is satisfied that the delay that would be caused by proceeding on notice would or might entail—
(a) A risk of harm; or
(b) Undue hardship—
to the applicant or a child of the applicant’s family, or both.
7.9 Where fathers and men are the predominant respondents and associated respondents to protection orders, any indicator of inconsistency with practices must be given serious consideration as fault damages the integrity of men and fatherhood.
Peters v Davidson  2 NZLR 164
7.10 Where the obvious victim of any bias, are the sons and daughters of the men and fathers the paradoxical without notice removal of the fathers from their association is directly inconsistent with the child’s interests as protected by s4 of the COCA:
4 Child’s welfare and best interests to be paramount
(1) The welfare and best interests of the child must be the first and paramount consideration—
(a) in the administration and application of this Act, for example, in proceedings under this Act; and
(b) in any other proceedings involving the guardianship of, or the role of providing day-to-day care for, or contact with, a child.
Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration  NZLR 130
8. That the Court reissues the application for the original protection order rescinding the without notice status.
Statement of Claim against the Second Respondent
· Ultra vires; and
o Rigid application of predetermined policy
o Giving credibility to irrelevant factors
o Lack of consideration to relevant factors
9. The second respondent made a decision that could not be substantiated by the evidence before it. The decision was directly inconsistent with the powers within its jurisdiction. In making the decision the LCRO overstepped its authority as a Lay Observer and rewrote law.
9.1 The behaviour is inconsistent with the powers conveyed on the LCRO and in breach of its function under s192 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006.
192 Functions of Legal Complaints Review Officer
The functions of the Legal Complaints Review Officer are—
(a) to exercise the powers of review conferred on the Legal Complaints Review Officer by this Act:
(b) to promote, in appropriate cases, the resolution, by negotiation, conciliation, or mediation, of—
(i) complaints; or
(ii) such issues relating to complaints as the Legal Complaints Review Officer specifies:
(c) to provide advice to the New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Society of Conveyancers and the Minister on any issue that the Legal Complaints Review Officer identifies in the course of carrying out reviews (being an issue that relates to the manner in which complaints are received and dealt with under this Act or any rules made under this Act).
10. The Court should return the LCRO decision to the MSA for reconsideration and under such terms that the Court deems appropriate.
DATED this the second day of August 2009.
Benjamin Morland Easton
TO: Registrar, High Court of New Zealand Palmerston North
AND Family Court of New Zealand, Palmerston North
AND Legal Complaints Review Officer (CROWN) Level 10, Unisys House 56 Terrace